The Industrial Cluster Plan of the Japanese government and the realities of regional economies in Japan Der Industrie-Cluster-Plan der japanischen Regierung und die Realitiiten der regionalen Ókonomien Japans
I Introduction
The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Tr ade and Industry (METI, formerly known as the MITI or Ministry of In ternational Tr ade and Industry) launched its Industrial Cluster Plan for the resurgence of regional economies in 2001. According to the METI's Industrial Cluster Plan Promotion Office (2004) , since the mid 1990s it had become difficult to continue the policy of factory relocation from three main metropolitan areas to pro vincial areas, because Japanese manufacturing com panies have invested not at home but in China and the ASEAN countries. After the model of Silicon Valley, METI hopes that regional economies in Japan can en dogenously resurge through the implementation of the Industrial Cluster Plan. It is vital for this policy to cre ate a human network within each "region" 1 • If actors si multaneously compete and cooperate with each other in this network, then it is possible to create a competi tive industrial cluster, and ventures can be bom one af ter another from within the cluster. METI believes that industrial clustering and innovative activities do not come into being only spontaneously, but that they can also be created through government policies.
The theory behind the Industrial Cluster Plan stems from Porter (1990 Porter ( , 1998 ; some Japanese economists also advocate his thinking and provide the METI with theoretical support for the Plan. But they fail to notice a weak point of Porter's theory and have neglected some important aspects of regional economies in Japan. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the policy and theoretical thinking of the Industrial Cluster Plan by shedding light on some of its concrete projects, especially on the project in the "region" along Chuo Freeway, which stretches westward from Tokyo.
The research method is qualitative based on long-term observations and hearings in the area along Chuo Freeway and a critical reading of publications by the central government and its theoretical supporters. Between summer 1997 and 2003, jointly with Prof. Matsuhashi, Meiji University in Tokyo, I conducted interviews with the presidents of 78 successful SMEs in this area." Our intensive interviews focused on the themes of how SMEs have innovated in their products and process technologies, and the extent to which their own networking with companies, public and semi-public organizations, both within the locality and outside it, contributed to these innovations. We also repeatedly interviewed the people in charge of the promotion of local economies at each local public organization to collect detailed information on the localities and SMEs.
2 Outline of the Industrial Cluster Plan in Japan and its theoretical problems
Industrial cluster projects and the underlying model
The Industrial Cluster Plan is implemented not by the central bureau of the METI, but by its nine "regional" bureaus. Their territories and 19 projects are depicted in Figure 1 . These projects cover almost all of Japan's major manufacturing areas. But there are quite important differences in the constitution of manufacturing sectors among these areas. While some projects aim at promoting the new clustering of high-tech industries, such as biotechnologies and IT (information and communication technologies), the others aim at the resurgence of traditional industries, such as the steel and chemical industry in Kyushu and metal and machine industries in Kanto. METI considers it necessary to promote both types of industries for the resurgence of regional economies, as well as for Japanese economy as a whole.
According to the Industrial Cluster Plan Promotion Office of METI (2004), each of its "regional" bureaus plays a role as the hub of its own network. This involves (1) visiting local enterprises; (2)organizing research groups, Fostering IT-Ventures creating opportunities for exchange among actors and holding seminars; (3) promoting exchanges and linkages among companies, universities and governments through activities of coordinators; (4) supporting marketing through the introduction of professional trading companies, and (5) supporting organizations which play the core role in the development of an industrial cluster through the initiative of private companies", METI recognized as of the beginning of 2004 that the Projects to Vitalize Regional Industries carried out in five areas by METI's Kanto Bureau (Fig. 1) were ahead of the other projects in promoting the Plan (METI website"). The Kanto Bureau refers to these areas as "regions", but this is somewhat misleading since it is doubtful whether each area satisfies an important criterion for a region in the sense of social and cultural geography. This discipline emphasizes the identity of the people in determining whether an area is to be called a region (Gregory 1994, p. 508) . Storper (1997) attaches great importance to the relational assets in discussing regional economies. The relational assets cannot be separated from the regional identity of the people. Regional and local identity is very important for the promotion of regional economies. The present author will discuss this point later in this paper.
Among the five "regions", the western part of the Capital region' is especially appreciated as a model for the Industrial Cluster Project. This "region" equates almost exactly to the western suburbs in the Tokyo metropolitan area and stretches along the western part of National Road No. 16, which extends for some 40 km radiating from Tokyo's CBD. The central cities are Kawagoe in Saitama prefecture, Hachioji in Tokyo prefecture and Sagamihara in Kanagawa prefecture (Fig.2) . This area is referred to by the METI as the TAMA region. This is a wordplay as TAMA means Technology Advanced Metropolitan Area and Tama has also been a traditional name of the county in the western suburbs of Tokyo since the 8th century A.D.
Industrialization in this area started in the 1940s as some factories were relocated to escape the danger of air raids. The relocation of large factories increased during the 1950s and 1960s, and automobile, electronics, machinery and related industries have since agglomerated along National Road No.16 (Takeuchi 1983, pp.28-37, 53-72, 79-81) . The MITI's Kanto bureau recognizes this area as a high-tech industrial cluster. If one extends this area from Sagamihara south-eastwards to the sea and includes the whole area of Tokyo prefecture, then it accounts for 27 per cent of the engineering faculties of universities, 37 per cent of private R&D institutes, and 39 per cent of software houses in Japan (Kanto Bureau of the MITI 1996, pp. 27-28,142-144 In this respect, the panelists only emphasize face-toface contacts, and one panelist regards an area of distance between 160 and 320 km as a "region", in Porter's terms. They think that face-to-face contacts are a prerequisite for knowledge creation. These are surely important for information flows, but face-to-face contacts merely offer the possibility of knowledge creation. It is not enough to innovate something and create new knowledge only by means of face-to-face contacts. We should remember that a pioneer on this theme does not attach importance to tacit knowledge alone, but rather to interactive transformation between tacit knowledge and coded knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) . According to Nonaka & Konno (2000) , it is important to have ba 6 , or a place of practice, where one can transform tacit knowledge into coded knowledge and vice versa. Knowledge can be created only in some contexts, and thus only in some place of practice. Knowledge concerning business usually emerges from intimate communication and collaborative practices among the actors concerned. And they can be effective in a place or a region in which there is social capital in the sense of Coleman (1990, pp. 300-313) . It is usually accumulated in a local place or a region with which the local people and companies feel a strong sense ofidentification. It is not a simple function of geographical distance. And identity surely correlates with local and regional history. If we speak of an industrial cluster as a region, we should not ignore this important component of a region, namely the identification of the people with it. All the panelists -as well as Porter (1998) ignored this aspect of a region.
There is one more problem with Ishikura's thinking. She restricts innovations solely to product innovation. She asserts that it is almost impossible to gain competitive advantage by means of process innovation (Ishikura 2003, p. 21 ). This thinking is too narrow to understand innovation. This is a matter of the "carrying out of new combinations" according to Schumpeter (1926, p. 100-101) . He included not only the introduction of a new good, but also the introduction of a new method of production into the concept of the "carrying out of new combinations." It is self-evident that a better good can be produced through better process technology and its related organization (OECD 2001, pp. 12-13) . The division of labor between final-goods makers and parts suppliers, including SMEs specializing in some process technology, is predominant in the metal and machinery manufacturing industries of Japan (Watanabe 1997) . Therefore, we cannot ignore process innovation and its related organizational innovation if we focus on a region where a large number of SMEs are located.
3 Attempt to bring about the resurgence of a regional industrial cluster in a provincial area of Japan
Outline ofthe Suwa county
The Suwa county in Nagano prefecture presents an interesting case for reexamining the Industrial Cluster Plan. It is located along Chuo Freeway and represents a core element of the industrial cluster project along this motorway alongside Kofu city in the Yamanashi prefecture (Fig. 2) . The Suwa county consists of six municipalities, of which Okaya shows the highest density of the main manufacturing branches, followed by ShimoSuwa, Suwa and Chino (Tab. 1). SMEs clearly dominate in the county.
Its manufacturing stems from the 19th century, when the silk industry flourished as one of Japan's export bases, especially at Okaya and Shimo-Suwa. But the main industries in the last decades originate from the precision-instruments factories relocated from Tokyo during World War II, as well as from companies established just after the war. Many companies were established to subcontract for these companies, and there were also spin-offs from the larger local companies between the second half of the 1940s and the 1960s.
SMEs in the county have evolved their own products and businesses since the beginning of the 1980s; for example, the largest and most important company in this county, Seiko Epson Corporation, has gradually changed its main products from watches to printers for personal computers and electronic devices such as liquid crystal displays (Seiko Epson Corporation 2001).7 While this company is classified as a large multinational producing final consumer goods, most of the active SMEs in the Suwa county are producers of parts for the automotive industry, electronic equipment and industrial machines, and have also invested either in China or ASEAN countries.
In any case, the industrial tradition of precision machinery and instruments influenced the evolution of local companies. In this sense, we can find path dependency in the development of the county's economy over the last half century. It is clear, however, that the manufacturing industry has shrunk in the meantime. In 1975, the number of factories in the main manufacturing sectors stood at more than 800, employing around 30,000 people in three cities in the Suwa county. But the former figure has decreased to less than 700 and the latter to about 20,000 ( It is worth noting that the most important corporations and the most active and successful SMEs in the Suwa county were represented on the committee (Tab. 3). Local governments and university professors also became members. METI's Kanto Bureau participated in the meeting of the committee as an observer. The head of the Committee was a managing director of Sankyo Seiki. Among the five working groups established under the supervision of the committee, four were led by employees of Sankyo Seiki (Tab. 4). Therefore Sankyo Seiki seemed to take the initiative in driving the plan forward.
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We should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that Sankyo Seki would have sought to capitalize on the R&D and marketing power of the other local corporations and use the grant-in-aid from the government for its own purposes. It is embedded in the local society and its president had served as chairman of the Council of Suwa Techno Lakeside Regional Center, and its predecessor, since 1999. He must have felt a sense of mission that his corporation was able to contribute to the resurgence of the regional economy which had been in crisis since the beginning of the 1990s (Tab. 5 15 ) .
In March 2003, the working groups presented a final report, according to which large corporations in the machinery, electronics and automobile industries recognize it as one of the most important tasks to shorten the lead time from R&D through experimental production to mass production of various new models and goods. Competitive advantage for manufacturing corporations depends not only upon the quality and cost of goods, but also upon the capability to shorten the lead time. There may well be a great deal of demand for the outsourcing of agile experimental production of parts of new models and goods, especially because it has become more and more difficult for large corporations to maintain all the capabilities concerning R&D and experimental manufacture of parts in-house.
On the other hand, there were problems regarding whether the local companies could collaborate to respond to the demand. Therefore the working groups of the committee looked into which companies were ready and capable of collaborating with each other for the new business. As a result, about ten companies were identified as having both the intention and capability of entering into collaboration. They recognize that their competitive advantage depends upon their skill in the fine processing of all the kinds of materials. They think that the starting point of the innovation, for -1990,2002 Note: The main manufacturing industries mean the total of fabricated metal p.roducts, general machinery, electrical machinery and equipment, transportation machinery, precision instruments and machinery, metal-processing SMEs, is the acquisition of information on new materials. Otherwise they could not create new knowledge on how to be more agile in undertaking fine processing than their competitors. SMEs in the metal and machine industry are always under the pressure of this kind of competition. And skill or knowledge for processing new materials is tacit knowledge rather than coded knowledge, at least at the earlier stage of R&D and experimental production. This recognition of the SMEs contrasts with the thinking of the advocators of the Industrial Cluster Plan at the level of the central government.
Although the report of the committee guaranteed the feasibility of the new business, it took several months before the decision was made as to who would really take on the risk of a start-up. As a result, a new company was established in April 2004 through the investment of seven local manufacturing corporations and three producer-service companies (Tab. 6). This venture is intended to function as the node between local SMEs and customers located outside Suwa county.
RuR 1/2006 3.5 Social capital for collaboration How was it possible for the local people to implement these three collaborative undertakings? One of the important factors is social capital. In the world outside business, presidents and managers of the SMEs have intimate and intricate relationships with each other in the locality. Not only chambers of commerce and industry, but also the other societies such as Lions Clubs, Junior Chambers, alumni associations of schools, etc. play an important role for the experience of cooperation outside business. Let me refer to a few examples of social capital in the locality.
Soode Nagano and Hiraide Precision, which rank among the founders of the Sekai Saisoku Shisaku Center, demonstrate a typical case of social capital accumulated among SMEs. The presidents of both companies became acquainted with each other in the Junior Chamber of Okaya in the 1980s.This is an organization for the younger generation of entrepreneurs, and its object is not business but to make a contribution to the vitalization of the local community in Okaya. The presidents of these two companies established a network with the other local entrepreneurs participating in the Junior Chamber, at the beginning of the 1990s, and have jointly presented their own technologies in various domestic and foreign trade fairs. Their collaborative marketing activities have been successful, and reliance on each other has become solid (Yamamoto and Matsuhashi 2000) .
We find another example of social capital in some members of the DTF research group. They were suppliers almost exclusively for Seiko Epson Corporation until the beginning of the 1980s. Seiko's technology was transferred to these local SMEs in the 1960s and the 1970s. As Seiko Epson began to change its main products in the mid 1980s, it encouraged its suppliers to seek main markets outside the locality. Nevertheless, the relationship between Seiko Epson and the local SMEs has been maintained, and an entrepreneur of a DTF member company told me that there is atmosphere of cooperation among many local SMEs when Seiko Epson exercises leadership in some event (Yamamoto and Matsuhashi 1999) . The local people maintain this atmosphere through everyday exchanges and collaboration outside of business. On the other hand, local alumni associations are also important for human relations. One of the DTF members was able to gather engineers and craftsmen as it changed from a mere metal processor to a manufacturer of specialized machinery for large corporations because the president of this company had close personal relationships in the local community.
Cooperation and collaboration in business can be established easily among the SMEs on the basis of social 38 capital accumulated over the last few decades. They have common experiences in the daily events and the local public sphere surrounding business.
Conclusion
As described above, the Industrial Cluster Plan has evolved from technopolis policy. The advocators for the Plan always emphasize cooperation in an industrial cluster. But they do not make clear on what terms companies and people cooperate smoothly with each other. It is social capital that underlies this cooperation. It is true that face-to-face contacts are a prerequisite for the proper functioning of social capital. But social capital cannot be accumulated solely through such contacts.
It is much more important that the actors have experiences of practicing something collaboratively than merely of exchanging information with each other. As a result of such practices, they come to feel identity with their local community. In the Suwa county, there have been various occasions for the SMEs and their people to cooperate with each other. An area where the people have common experiences is literally a region filled with social capital. This is a relational asset in a region and equivalent to the untraded interdependencies (Storper 1997) .
It is true that the policy aims to inspire and boost the morale of SMEs. But this policy from central government is not as important as the endogenous cooperation among the leaders in the local economies and the local governments. This cannot be fostered merely through face-to-face contacts. And even if the central government and its related organizations artificially delineate the boundary of a region, this does not mean it will function as a locale for collaboration, as exemplified in the TAMA "region" and the "region" along Chuo Freeway for the Industrial Cluster Plan.
Various new combinations in the Schumpeterian sense have emerged in the Suwa county. But the time has not yet come for us to be able judge whether the new combinations really can lead to business success. The term "region" is a translation of the Japanese word" chiiki". This word is vague in some respects. "Chiiki" can mean various areas of very different geographical scales, from a primary school catchment area through, for example, to Kyushu Island, consisting of several prefectures, or to a transnational area such as Asia. The Japanese government uses "chiiki" both for nine jurisdictional areas and for an area smaller than a prefecture. This reflects the everyday usage of the term by Japanese people. In this paper, the present author uses the term "region" with quotation marks whenever this word is used by MET!.
The results of our interviews are recorded in Yamamoto(2000; .
The subjects of these actions are not officials of the "regional" bureau of METI, but local actors and coordinators, as this paper later shows.
www.meti.go.jP/POliCY/local_eCOnOmY/downloadfiles/BusinesSenvironmencprom_div/CLUSTER.html
The Capital region is a very wide area specified on the basis of the enforcement ordinance (1957) of the Law of the Capital Region Development, which was passed in 1956. It consists of the prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki and Yamanashi.
Ba is a Japanese word which can be translated by the term "place". But ba does not only mean a geographical location, but also an occasion or an opportunity when subjects interact with each other. Ba is occasionally translated as "platform". In a physical sense, a room in a building can become ba. But a very wide area, in which it is not easy for people to interact with each other, cannot become ba. 
The peak period of manufacturing development in the Suwa county, as well as in Japan, is the beginning of the 1990s, although for reasons of space the present author does not here include the detailed statistics.
We should note that the word "region" is prescribed in a singular form. But there are several regions with strong local identities in the area along Chuo Freeway.
The description of these three undertakings is based on interviews conducted in 2002 and 2003 by the present author, and his colleague Prof. Matsuhashi, with key figures in the region and on a number of documents.
(1) This is the name which the local people in the Suwa-Okaya region use for the event in English. But it would be better to use the name "Fair of the Manufacturing Industry in the Suwa-Okaya region".
This company calls itself in English "Rapid PreProduction Support" (or RPS).
Since the reform was carried out for the organization of Japan's central government, the Research Institute of MITI, which is located in the science city ofTsukuba, has become an independent administrative agency and since 2001 has borne the name "National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology".
MITI or METI believe it necessary and effective to allocate a coordinator in an area to promote exchange among various SMEs and universities. To this end it launched a program in 2000 to subsidize local governments and the related organizations, which are eager to promote collaborative undertakings among businesses and universities, to help to cover the labor costs and the necessary expenses of employing a coordinator.
(5) Table 5 includes the indicators of Ota-ku in Tokyo and Japan as a whole, besides three cities in the Suwa county, as well as two cities in the TAMA "region". Ota-ku is a well-known industrial district in Tokyo and the largest agglomeration of SMEs engaging with metal and machinery industries in Japan. The sudden drop in the indices for Suwa is attributed to the exodus of the manufacturing function of Seiko Epson from this city in the second half of the 1980s.
